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The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child-Resistant
Packaging on Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestions
By W. KiP VIscusI*
In 1972 the Food and Drug Administration imposed a protectivebottlecap requirement on aspirin and other selected drugs.
This regulationepitomizesthe technological
approach to social regulation.The strategy
for reducingchildren'spoisoningriskswas to
design caps that would make opening containers of hazardous substances more difficult. This engineering approach will be
effectiveprovidedthat children'sexposureto
hazardous products does not increase. If,
however, parents leave protective caps off
bottles because they are difficultto open, or
increasechildren'saccess to these bottles because they are supposedly"child proof,"the
regulationmay not have a beneficialeffect.
Indeed, in this case there was no significant impactof the regulationon aspirinpoisoning rates,but therehas been an alarming,
upwardshift in the trend of analgesicingestion rates since 1972. The source of this
pattern appearsto be attributableto a general reductionin parental caution with respect to such medicines,which has had an
adversespillovereffect on unregulatedproducts. The economicmechanismsinvolvedcan
be best understoodby consideringthe nature
of individuals'responseto regulatoryprotection.
1. The Lulling Effect: A Conceptual Analysis

One can distinguishthreedifferentmechanismsby whichprotectivepackagingrequirements can lead to actions on the part of
*Professor and Director, Center for Study of Business Regulation, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, N.C. 27706. This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation
to the Center for Study of Business Regulation, Fuqua
School of Business, Duke University. I am indebted to
Robert Viscusi for insightful comments and to William
Evans for able research assistance.
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parents and their children that are at least
potentially counterproductive.First, regulations will lead to a reductionin safety-related
efforts for the affectedproduct. Second, the
regulationmay produce misperceptionsthat
lead consumersto reducetheirsafety precautions becausethey overestimatethe product's
safety. Finally, if there are indivisibilitiesin
one's actions(for example,choosingwhether
to keep medicinesin a bathroomcabinet or
in the kitchen),regulatingone product may
affect the safety of other products. These
effects are quite general and are not restrictedto the case of protectivebottlecaps.
The existing theoreticalliteratureon individual responsesto regulatoryprotectionbegan with the analysis by Sam Peltzman
(1975), who showedthat seatbeltswould lead
to increased driving intensity (for example,
less caution or higherspeeds).The economic
mechanismgeneratingthis effectis similarto
that which produces adverse incentives or
moralhazardproblemsin the insurancecontext. As one reduceseitherthe probabilityof
a loss or the size of the loss, individual
incentivesto take precautionaryactions will
be reduced.Regulationsfunction much like
insurancein this regard,with the only difference being that one need not pay an insurance premium.(There may, however,be
an effect of the regulationon the product
price.)
In my 1979 article, I derived a similar
result for the case of workersafety for quite
general classes of risk-averse preferences,
where the safety measuresalso affected the
wage rate. Except in the case of very stringentlyenforcedgovernmentregulations,firms
would not make technologicalchangesin the
workplace that were counterproductive.
Compliance with policies such as seatbelt
and bottlecaprequirementsis less discretionary, however,so one cannotruleout counter-
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productive regulatory effects in these instances.
To investigatethese effectsmore formally,
consider a simple model that captures the
essential featuresof these analyses.Let s be
the stringencyof the governmentpolicy and
e be the precautionaryeffort,where each of
these reduces the probabilityp (e, s) of an
accidentat a diminishingrate. Alternatively,
one can make the mechanismof influence
the size of the accident loss L, as in Peltzman, but for purposes of this model I will
make L a constant.The individual'seffort e
generatesa disutilityV(e), where V', V" > 0.
Finally, let the person have an income
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The payoff in the case of an accident is
I - V(e)- L, and the payoff if there is not
an accidentis I - V(e). The individual'sex-

pected utility (assuming risk neutrality) is
I - V(e)- p(e, s)L. In setting the optimal
level of e, one equates the marginalreduction in the loss PeL to the marginalvalue of
the effort - Ve, leading to the optimal point

A in Figure1.
The effectof the regulationon safety effort
will be negative,or
de
ds

-

Pes

FIGURE 1. PRECAUTIONARYBEHAVIOR
AND EXPECTEDLOSSES

for this to occurhave neverbeen investigated
and are quite stringent. It is not sufficient
that the marginalexpectedloss reductionat
point C be no greaterthan at A. The requirement is strongersince the marginaldisutility
of effort Ve will be lower at lower effort
levels. To equate the marginalexpected loss
reduction peL to the marginal effort cost
- V,e the loss curve EL1 must be flatter at

0

PeeL + Vee

providedthePes > 0 (or Les > 0 in Peltzman's
loss model). For safety effortsto decline,the
safety regulationmust reduce the marginal
safety benefits from precautionaryefforts,
that is, the reduction in the expected loss
from higher levels of effort is less negative
than before.One will then choose a point to
the left of point B on the EL1 curve in
Figure 1. This effect should not be particularly controversial.Few would question the
opposite relationshipwhere individuals increase their precautionswhen moving from
EL1 to ELo. For example, one will drive
more carefully on icy streets and reduce
cigarette smoking if exposed to synergistic
asbestosrisks.
What is more problematicis whetherthe
reductionin precautionswill be so greatthat
therewill be a reductionin safety to a point
to the left of point C on EL1. The conditions

point C than ELowas at point A. Since there
is the additionalrestrictionthat EL1 lie below ELo, it will be difficult to meet these
requirements.
The chance that the impact of protective
regulations may be counterproductivemay
be enhancedif individualseitherdo not perceive accuratelythe accidentprobabilities,or
do not fullybearthe accidentcosts. If parents
assume"child-resistant"caps are child proof,
they may overestimatethe safety associated
with these products.Similarly,since there is
some evidence that individuals tend to set
very small probabilitiesequal to zero, the
safety-enhancingpropertiesof caps may reduce the risk so much that parentsignorethe
poisoning risk. In each case, safety precautions will decline, perhaps to so great an
extent that overall safety is reduced. For
example, parents may select point D off of
their perceivedloss curve EL2 in a situation
where the true loss curve is EL1 and the
actual outcomeis point F.
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A similareffect could occur if parents do
not fully value the welfareof their children,
or if driversdo not fully internalizethe accident costs to pedestriansand other parties.
Unlike the case of biased probabilisticbeliefs, this modificationin the problem need
not entail a shift in the relativevalues of the
accident loss in the regulated and unregulated situations. Thus, the ELo and EL1
curvesmay both simply shift proportionally.
In contrast, misperceptionssuch as those
discussed above necessarilylead to a comparativelygreaterdownwardshift in the perceivedexpectedloss, increasingthe chanceof
a counterproductiveeffect.
One'sprecautionaryactionsmay affectthe
safety of unregulatedproducts as well as
those that are regulated.In the case of childresistantbottlecaps,parentsmay make overall decisions regardingthe storage of medicines. Should they keep all of the medicines
in the bathroomcabinet, on a kitchen shelf,
or in a safety-latcheddrawer?More generally, should they worry about access to
medicinesor undertakeonly a mild level of
precautions,since the most hazardousproducts are presumably protected by childresistantcontainers?
The analyticsof this effortdecision parallel that given above, where the only differenceis that the ELo and EL1 curvesare a
weighted average of the component risks,
wheresomeproductsareprotectedand others
are not. A joint risk curve EL1 will tend to
shift downwardless in responseto a regulation than a comparablecurvefor a particular
regulatedproduct, since the presenceof the
unregulated product will dampen the response.
Thereis a clearcutempiricaltest of whether
indivisibleactions such as this play a role. If
there are such spillovereffects,the reduction
in safety-enhancingefforts induced by the
regulationshould increasethe risk posed by
the unregulatedproduct. In addition, the
safety improvementof the regulatedproduct
will be reducedat least in part by the reduction in individualprecautions.The net effect
on safety could be adversefor the regulated
productor for both productscombined,but
one must satisfy fairly stringentconditions
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for the net effectto be adverseunlessmisperceptions of the risk play a majorrole.
Bottlecaps
II. The Effectof Child-Resistant

A widely touted productsafety regulation
successstoryis child-resistantbottlecaps.The
first caps requiredunderthis regulationwere
for aspirinand selecteddrugsin 1972. Before
the adventof protectivepackaging,manufacturersconcentratedtheir effortson measures
such as decreasingthe numberof tabletsper
bottle, warninglabels, and educationalcampaigns. Here I will summarizesome of the
resultsfrom my forthcomingstudy regarding
the effectivenessof safety caps, which provides very strongevidenceregardingthe role
of individualactions that differin character
from the seatbeltcase (see Glenn Blomquist,
forthcoming,for a review).
In 1971 aspirinwas responsiblefor a fatal
poisoning rate of 2.6 per million children
under age 5, and by 1980 this rate had
droppedto 0.6. The overallaspirinpoisoning
rate exhibiteda similardrop, from 5.0 to 1.7
per 1,000.Whilethesedeclinesweredramatic,
after takinginto accountthe trendin aspirin
poisoningsand the declinein aspirinsales in
the 1970's, thereis no statisticallysignificant
impact of the regulation. This result was
obtained using both a regulation dummy
variable,which assumeda value of 1 in the
1972-80 period,and a variablethat reflected
the fraction of aspirin sold with safety cap
bottles.
This fraction of capped bottles remained
at just over half of all aspirinsold since firms
were permittedto marketone size of aspirin
containerwithouta child-resistantcap. Typically, firms chose the best selling size (the
100-tabletbottle).
Despite the constant sales share of safety
capped aspirin, there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of aspirin-related
poisonings associated with protectivepackaging. Whereas40 percentof all aspirinpoisoningsin 1972 were from safety cap bottles,
this figurerose to 73 percentby 1978. This
patternis noteworthyfor two reasons.First,
safety cap bottles are by no means risk free,
as they accountfor a majorityof the poison-
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ings and a disproportionateamount comparedto theirsales.Almosthalf of all aspirin
poisonings are from bottles that had been
left open. Second, there appears to be an
alarmingincrease in the rate of safety cap
poisonings.While each of these effects may
be attributablein part to consumersmatching their aspirin bottle-typechoice (with or
without a cap) to whetheror not they have
young children,another factor may be that
there is an increaseddegreeof irresponsibility regardingmedicines.
Such irresponsibilityis consistentwith evidence of an apparentspillovereffect on previouslyunregulatedanalgesics,whichinclude
acetaminophenpreparationssuch as Tylenol.
Analgesicpoisoningrates for childrenunder
age 5 escalatedfrom 1.1 per 1,000 in 1971 to
1.5 per 1,000 in 1980. Even after takinginto
account increasesin analgesicsales, 47 percent of this increase is attributableto an
unexplained upward shift in the analgesic
poisoning rate beginningin 1972. The coupling of the absenceof any shift in the trend
of aspirinpoisoningrateswith an upsurgein
analgesic poisoning rates is consistent with
the hypothesisthat thereis a significantindivisibility in safety precautions. Moreover,
absence of a significanteffect of safety caps
on aspirin poisonings and the 47 percent
unexplained shift in analgesic poisonings
suggeststhat the impactof the regulationon
balance was counterproductive,leading to
3,500 additionalpoisonings of children under age 5 annuallyfrom analgesics.
It is possible but unlikely that such a
strong impact could emerge from fully rational consumer decisions. Moreover, this
effect is not only large but reasonably
widespread,as I have identified a similar
patternfor prescriptiondrugs,and for cleaning and polishing agents. A more likely ex-
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planation for these dramaticeffects is that
consumers have been lulled into a lesssafety-consciousmode of behavior by the
existence of safety caps. The presumed
effectiveness of the technological solution
may have induced increased parental irresponsibility.

A varietyof regulatoryeffortshave sought
to reduceindividualrisks throughmandated
technological changes. These measureswill
be effective if individual actions remain
unchanged.In practice,these regulationswill
produce a lulling effect on consumerbehavior because the perceived need for precautions will decline, potentiallyproducingadverse spillovereffects on the safety of other
products. The strength of these impacts
should highlight the importance of taking
individual behavior into account when designing regulations intended to promote
safety.
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